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The last sixty years have seen international economic organisations
maintain a position at the forefront of promoting economic growth and
socioeconomic development. These organisations have not achieved
as much against certain benchmarks, and several observers have ac-
cused them of being unqualified to meet the needs of the poor, and
even found them guilty of something worse, such as famine and dis-
ease. Although these organisations have organisational behaviour and
skills, many of their funded projects lack forcefulness to such an ex-
tent that they should only be answerable through achieving certain eco-
nomic facts by way of ethics andmorals. We design ethics andmorals as
two interconnected concepts, and the rationale that binds all economic
agents to their respective obligations must be interpreted by eﬀective
courses of action dictated by economic realities.
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Introduction
No doubt, economic opportunities have been missing in the world,
though unevenly over the last decades. In the light of the outcomes of
the international course of actions that have been confused, pressures
for more results have come from international organisations such as the
United Nations, for example, that held the Millennium Assembly in New
York in September 2000 in an endeavour to set targets and deadlines, by
which better human welfare should be completed. These targets, known
as the millennium development goals, were set for 2015. By then, the
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international community seems to be committed to halving that 30 per
cent of the world population that in 1990 lived in the absolute poverty of
less than one dollar a day. It should also provide universal primary ed-
ucation, ensure a sustainable growth compatible with the preservation
of the environment, reduce under-age-five mortality by two-thirds and
maternal mortality by three-quarters, and halve the population with-
out access to safe drinking water. Nevertheless, was the game played by
international agencies dealing with national diﬃculties a cause of uncon-
structive economic outcomes? Will these organisations be able to reach
the millennium development goals? Is there anything else that these or-
ganisations can do apart from diminishing the eﬀect on the autonomy
in domestic economic choices?
The aim of this article is to approach these challenging questions by
looking at a special feature of ethics and morals. The thesis is to view
the conduct of international organisations as lacking in exact ethical and
moral codes in order to gain distinctive consensus and commitments on
mainstream programmes. Ethics andmorals must be designed as two in-
terconnected concepts to enable all national and international economic
agents design eﬀective policies and commitments. The next section out-
lines the achievements in international economic aﬀairs and focuses on
the distinction between ethics and morals. We unveil distinctive levels
of ethical involvement for domestic and external partners, and suggest a
new ethical value commitment, which, inter alia, concerns all actors, en-
gaging them to agree on mutually accepted conditions and programmes
and accomplish targets through equal bases. This new logic stimulates
domestic economic ownership and international commitment for cred-
ible programmes while keeping all of the actors involved fully account-
able. The final section provides concluding remarks.
Ethics andMoral Codes
Actually, there are many aspects of understanding how ethical values
have developed over the last few decades. They concern domestic eco-
nomic and political aﬀairs as well as international aﬀairs. Although these
values originate from religion and are tied to the Greek word ethos,while
morals derives from the Latin word mores, morality pertains more to
a personal sphere of ethics, and ethics itself is connected to rules and
widely accepted principles, which aﬀect a much larger audience.
Besides the substantive issue concerning distinctions between moral
and ethical codes that are magnified by phases of deepening interaction
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between nations and regions, there is still the requirement to envisage an
ethically satisfactory behaviour in the sphere of international economics,
thus complementing critical scrutiny of domestic values regarding truth
and social justice. Living in harmony with valuable norms and standards
of excellence, attending to the betterment of social well-being, these are
the ultimate goals of any international community.
The exact role of ethics and morals was not mentioned much in the
past literature. They are crucial to strengthening international relief and
world financial stability, but this must occur not at the expense of coun-
try’s eﬀective economic upturn. Their authority pertains to international
and domestic economic dimensions; the ethical components of institu-
tional policies and norms, and eﬀorts to revitalise the economy when it is
either in danger of even a tiny slowdown, or to help rescue suﬀering pop-
ulations and oﬀer protection in perilous emergencies. This sounds like
going back to Adam Smith’s 1759 (2002) observations on charity, in some
ways. Serious eﬀorts by the institutions to overlook economic troubles
are very revealing in a financial world of certain selected market failures
and domestic ineptitudes. We reject Mises’ (1949) critique of economic
interventionism and the state’s manipulation of the market, because it
could produce an undesirable consequence and, in turn, further rounds
of intervention. On the other hand, we support the issue of a government
recipient’s behaviour and recognise a determinant of charitable giving,
as long as there are specific forms of assistance by international agen-
cies (see Birch 1998). Still, the literature debates on the quality of institu-
tional design and the part played by geography and natural endowment
as additional causes of the missed socio-economic development. In fact,
the trait of national institutions might be the cause of diﬀerences in in-
come levels (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2002). These diﬀerences
could be caused perhaps also by geography and resource endowments as
claimed, among others, by Jeﬀrey Sachs (2003). Still, this drives us to un-
derstand the diﬀerence between what is moral and ethical and what has
to be done to combine these two values in a judicious setting.
Besides the moral attitude to lend support, we make the case for an
ethical approach that binds international organisations not to supersede
local realities. In fact, economic crises in specific regions of the world,
the challenging transition in East Europe, famine and diseases are all ev-
idence that a large share of the world’s population is far from enjoying a
minimum and ethically satisfactory living standard. As aforementioned,
the United Nations Millennium Assembly put forward a commitment to
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halve the 1990 rates of poverty, hunger and access to safe drinking wa-
ter by 2015, as well as to reduce the rate of child mortality by two thirds.
The international community renewed these commitments at the Mon-
terrey and Johannesburg meetings in 2002, when it took concrete steps
towards oﬃcial development assistance of 0.7%of donor countries’ gnp.
However, even that 0.7% would generate $ 142 billion each year, while
the sum should rise to $ 443 billion if the millennium development goals
are to be met (Besley and Burgess 2003). While the uk finance minister,
Gordon Brown, advanced the proposal to create an international finance
facility aimed at doubling aid, at the end of January 2004 the presidents
of Brazil and France insisted on a special global alliance against hunger
and poverty, including a taxation of profits generated by globalisation
through taxing arms sales or unspecified financial transactions.With this
in mind, the point of our discussion is to call for a new ethical approach
to these issues, and make a clear distinction between moral and ethical
views upon methods of action or the logic followed by international or-
ganisations.
The Logic of International Organisations: Domestic Aﬀairs
The years of the Great Depression, exchange rate instability, and unpro-
ductive protectionism that had damaged the world economy leading to
the Second World War, led to the creation of major international eco-
nomic agencies responsible for stabilising global financial markets. The
complex commitment to establish an acceptable base for an ethical be-
haviour prompted a set of policies aimed at achieving economic and
financial stability, and providing adequate economic resources to poor
countries. Tackling inflation and unbalanced public finances, prompt-
ing trade liberalisation, creating governance and strengthening financial
systems appeared to be ethically truthful, guiding principles. In contrast
with this is the current negative perception that the imf appears much
like a global sovereign, which does not enhance and improve wealth at
the community level. The case of Russia in the 1990s is revealing, eco-
nomically and politically, as it rests on the most authoritative examples
of what actually occurred during the past decade throughout much, if
not all of East Europe. Linking Russia’s, Argentina’s and other countries’
economic failure to the imf, is revealing at several levels.
Observers have elaborated on this point. Joseph Stiglitz (2002), the
prominent former chief economist of theWorld Bank, and formerWhite
House chief economic advisor, states, for example, that the much-touted
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transition strategies of international agencies like the imf were responsi-
ble for moving Russia and other transitional countries into poverty, be-
ginning in the very early 1990s. What is the underlying theme of Stiglitz’s
writing? Stiglitz (2000) argues that economists working at the imf are
frequently not very professional. Although many come from prominent
universities, Stiglitz states that they would often not be as good as better-
trained local economists. At the same time, Stiglitz casts doubt on the
logic the imf has followed in Russia.
This unenthusiastic view relates more to the specific Russian case, but
the essence of the argument has common characteristics, similar to those
we have observed when we looked at economic performance among re-
gions. Although we cannot substantiate a causal linkage between inter-
national economic organisations and economic performance, one fact is
clearly indisputable: real economic growth has collapsed throughout East
Europe since 1989. If the level for 1989 is set at 100, the Commonwealth of
Independent States witnessed a fall in real gdp to 54.2 by 1998, whereas
Central Europe recorded a fall in 1993 when it reached 76.9. The years
1993 and 1998 were also the transition low points in industrial produc-
tion. In Latin America, economic growth and crises have been managed
thoughtlessly. The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marked
the tragic end of the Argentina’s initially successful, decade-long exper-
iment with sound money and market-oriented economic reforms. The
imf consistently supported Argentina’s stabilisation and reform eﬀorts
in the decade leading up to the current crisis, and often pointed to Ar-
gentina’s policies as examples for other emerging market economies to
emulate.
A parallel with Stiglitz may be suggestive: Stiglitz was former chief
economist at the World Bank, while Mussa is the current imf chief
economist. While the former focuses on overall commitments of the imf
globally, the latter addresses the question of what went wrong in Ar-
gentina and what important errors the imf made either by supporting
inappropriate policies or failing to press for alternatives that might have
avoided catastrophe. While Stiglitz’s view implies a direct responsibility
on the part of the imf, Mussa emphasises the persistent inability of Ar-
gentina’s authorities to run a responsible fiscal policy at all levels, and
that this was the primary, avoidable cause of the country’s catastrophic
financial collapse.
The imf failed to press aggressively for amore responsible fiscal policy,
says Mussa (2002), but without an ethical commitment, no one may ask
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for any type of direct ethical approach to policy. Even Stiglitz lacks this
type of approach. Mussa (2002) also addresses the role of the Convert-
ibility Plan, which linked the Argentine peso rigidly and at parity with
the us dollar, thus playing a central role in both the initial success and
ultimate collapse of Argentina’s stabilisation and reform eﬀorts. While
the imf accepted this plan as a basic policy choice of the Argentine au-
thorities as long as it remained viable, it erred in the summer of 2001 by
extending further massive support for unsustainable policies rather than
insisting on new policy strategies that would possibly mitigate some of
the damage from the tragic crisis that became unavoidable.
Economic and Political Rationalisations
A point must be clarified at the outset. There are economic and political
rationalisations regarding policymaking. Political explanations concern-
ing imf involvement and disaster exist especially with regard to the So-
viet empire, when this was too important not to be helped (Sergi 2003a).
The imf needed a simple ethical validation to be able to oﬀer loans
to transition countries as well as finance eﬀorts to link them with the
West. Nor did concrete, substantive concerns about economic risks mat-
ter. Was a resurgence of trade and capital flows between East and West
demanding market stability? Unquestionably yes. The world economy
would have influenced transition economies by opening local markets
to foreign linkages. In addition, balance of payment disequilibria could
have threatened international stability by creating waves of financial con-
tagion from one country to the next, with the world economy not be-
ing able to bear the consequences of additional economic disorders. The
risks of further economic and political implosions were immense. Moral
charity and ethical yardsticks became crucial suddenly as further insta-
bility was expected to become the principal outcome should eﬀective re-
sponses not be put through. Consequently, the imf started signing loan
and conditionality agreements with almost every country in the former
Soviet bloc, and instructions for treating external imbalances, govern-
ment deficits, etc. became common in the conditionality agreements.
imf involvement in transition economics has been extreme; also the
World Bank, ngo’s and scholars working at academic institutions’ think
tanks have exercised a variety of conditionality. Whilst certain ngos were
considered watchdogs or were associated with given interests, there have
been unsupported and false statements that ngos and independent ex-
perts would be much superior to governmental agencies.
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Tutelage Policy
In principle, targeted aid and debt relief may serve as a takeoﬀ into self-
sustained growth or conditionality policy tutelage and as a substitute
for the inertia of entrenched domestic institutions and poor macroeco-
nomic policies. However, Boone (1996) states that aid serves to finance
consumption instead of growth and that international aid has a positive
impact in the countries exhibiting good macroeconomic policies, while
it has no impact in those countries carrying out poor policies (Burnside
and Dollar 2000). Bird (2002b) states that it is not empirically confirmed
that the role of the imf conditionality policy is positive. Indeed, the ma-
jority of fund programmes were incomplete and not subject to accu-
rate scrutiny (Bird 2002a), whereas inflation projections and outcomes of
programmes supported by the imf have been missed completely (Musso
and Phillips 2002). TheWorld Bank comes under a similar allegation: re-
viewing and evaluating past investment projects has been unsuccessful.
For instance, only some 5% ofWorld Bank’s loans are evaluated, yet only
after three to ten years from the time when the last disbursement takes
place. Indeed, these evaluations are made on a self-evaluation basis, that
is, by the same functionaries and implementing agencies, and are thus
far from being fair and independent. ngos or other international agen-
cies also do not show superior records in such fair evaluation of objec-
tives, and ‘they face some of the same incentives as oﬃcial agencies to
emphasize observable eﬀort rather than focus on less observable results’
(Easterly 2003, 38–39).
Unachieved targets might put under risk the credibility of future pro-
grammes, but too much criticism on their activities is unfair as well, oth-
erwise, one would opt for a dismantlement of international agencies. The
aforementioned agencies have also actually played an important role in
East Europe and other regions of the world. Nevertheless, the reason for
the discrepancy between what had been targeted and what was in fact
achieved lies in the fact that coordination with internal actors is missing
and policies are not calibrated locally. Transition economies and corrupt
political leaders did not coherently comply with the logic of the western
consensus, despite a variety of views on the subject. However, numerous
interplays shaping economic variables could not lead an international
watchdog to keep an eye on economic well-being without exercising tute-
lage on the complexity of the phenomenon; this is a matter of fact. De-
spite the fact that the imf overrules national players in the preparation
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of policies and does not believe in the transparency it urges on others, its
ethical choices could not be concealed over time.
Yet, a generalised criticism (including all the outcomes occurring in
all nations) fell squarely in the lap of the imf, which was not equitable.
Anyhow, it is possible to attribute reform failures either to domestic flaws
or to poor external advice characterised by incompetent sequencing of
economic strategies. While foreign advisers and international organisa-
tions have no total knowledge of local markets, they force fixed-format
programmes onmany. In fact, when circumstances are right, the imf, for
instance, does exactly what themodel predicts to tip the balance of incen-
tives in favour of a long run strategy of fiscal and monetary restraint, but
this is only a partial reinforcement of the credibility of national govern-
ments that are not all regarding credible political economies. Whatever
the proper rationale, operational decisions are firmly based on a few rig-
orous economic rules of conduct, which – if they existed – would provide
a straightforward counselling concerning a broad set of instruments. The
intended beneficiaries have no voice in how money is spent or economic
conditionality worked out, although notmuch was said about how to de-
sign an overall policy concerning domestic incentives and accountability
of all players involved in aid and conditionality. In Easterly’s words, ‘re-
search would likely involve principal-agent theory, organisation theory,
game theory and political economy’ (Easterly 2003, 39).
In the light of criticism, the imf has recently concluded an extensive
review of conditionality aimed at enhancing the eﬀectiveness of its sup-
port programmes. This recent consultative process recognises that suc-
cessful economic policy programmes must be founded on strong, credi-
ble in-country support. This remarkable development started in Septem-
ber 2000, when Horst Köhler took up his post as new imf managing
director, and soon after made a big pitch for a new Interim Guidance
Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality that would replace the
original one issued in 1979. Although an independent evaluation oﬃce
was created in July 2001 to have an independent evaluation of the imf’s
programmes, the imf’s Executive Board adopted revised conditionality
guidelines in September 2002. The new focal point shifted to distinguish
between what is relevant but not critical to the objectives of a supported
programme, and improve the division of the working operations be-
tween the imf and World Bank in ways that both would share the con-
ditionality policy.
Meanwhile, the World Bank has placed economists in the field ‘to
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have staﬀ working shoulder-to-shoulder with clients’ (Stern 2003, 49).
Whilst the World Bank’s recent strategy partially reflects the issue of hav-
ing credibility in its economic policies, because countries have to be co-
partners and not clients, the shared conditionality policy between the
imf and World Bank provides only an unfinished ethical agenda regard-
ing criticism of what the 1979 guidelines missed. The wto is trying to
help the process intended to insure free trade and equality among coun-
tries, but this is a complex task.
It is unquestionable that the imf has been refocusing the entire spec-
trum regarding its very unsuccessful idea of conditionality, with the
number of structural benchmarks having decreased and come under
coordination with that of the World Bank. This may develop into an
important step, although not definitive in itself (Sergi 2003b). Critics are
numerous and scholars continue to advance proposals, for instance to
lend only to pre-qualifying countries, except in the case of a systemic
need as proposed by the Meltzer Commission in March 2000 (Meltzer
2000), or to create two departments: a contingent-market department
and a crisis department – a case advanced by Caballero (2003). Never-
theless, there are prominent defenders such as Stanley Fischer (1999),
who advocates the need of the imf as a lender of last resort.
While the scientific economic community should be pleased with
these responses coming from the international economic organisations,
we criticise this evolution for lacking rigorous ethical underpinnings.
Some argue that the imf andWorld Bank may in fact have contradictory
goals since the crucial task of the imf is to eliminate current account
deficits, whilst that of the World Bank is to attract private capitals into a
country, or simply to spur loans and aid towards low-income countries.
The imf is not an aid agency, but has in fact delivered concessional loans
that have partially been forgiven, making loans equivalent to aid. Fabri-
cius (2002), who draws on field research conducted in Ghana, Pakistan,
Peru and Vietnam, recommends that the imf and World Bank pursue
a case-specific approach in deciding whether they should take the same
stance. Yet, what critics do not seem to comprehend is that, even though
the number of structural benchmarks is reducing, and even put under
coordination with the World Bank, a combined actors’ commitment to
credible, long-term adjustment polices is still lacking. Even in view of the
contradiction regarding theoretical imf–World Bank outcomes, the fact
is that any actual support for a programme cannot guarantee credibility
and commitment; therefore, a mutually shared policy may encompass
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the entire set of economic policies and transform such a possible con-
tradiction into short- and long-term components of credible economic
programmes. The imf sets its conditions de jure or de facto, but in the
light of a missing coordinated strategy, actors might blame the failure on
something else and this might result in continuous shifting of responsi-
bilities (Sergi 2003a).
The Eﬀectiveness of Policy Design
An intriguing question is why ethics as well as the achievement of proper
balance regarding domestic-external raison d’être have not been ad-
dressed in international economic relations, when economic institutions
and actors should fit into a global ethical agenda representing stability
and assistance. Financial and economic stability is a requirement for a
global well-being to which all agents must adhere. The real world asks
and wants supranational intervention of ad hoc agencies, keeping within
the principles of ethics and capitalism, without a stopping momentum
towards social economic justice. For instance, Novak (1993) defines the
civil society project concerning government and social activism, in which
civil society operates between community and state. The imf and World
Bank have been involved in domestic aﬀairs since the international com-
munity in the 1960s called on the imf to apply broader concepts regard-
ing financial stability, while looking into real growth as well. This may be
regarded as the first step concerning ethical innovation, bringing about
more discussion, while strengthening imf performance as lender of last
resort. Nevertheless, the international community cannot first profess
distinctive duties for the imf, and then assess its policy as disruptive,
causing a loss of national sovereignty. This contradiction exists because
there has been an unclear institutional distinction between moral and
ethical values, and the international community failed to recognise that
these two concepts must fit the same operational agenda. Recent global
economic realities have called out for international institutional super-
vision and national equilibrium, but this could only be accomplished if
an ethical and moral value commitment were to be accepted at both in-
ternational and domestic sides. A mere international involvement is not
suﬃcient per se to achieve results. As long as the imf and other organisa-
tions do not have to give away free money, a diﬀerent ethical and moral
commitment could pay oﬀ, securing a better business environment at
home through a distinctive commitment by national leaders and agents.
Because ethical principles and the vast involvement of world institu-
Managing Global Transitions
Economic Agents, Ethics and International Economic Organisations 73
tions are widely shared around the world, failure of past attempts was
more a matter of naiveté, and, at times, of policies uncommitted to eth-
ical guidelines, than of deliberately dishonest actions by international
agents. Put in a diﬀerent way, without a simultaneous involvement of
all domestic and international economic actors, the responsibility of es-
pecially the imf and other organisations may look omnipresent and al-
ways ineﬀective, yet nobody assumes national responsibilities.We should
consider the structural adjustments sponsored by the imf and theWorld
Bank as being insuﬃcient to introduce coordination and credibility, as
these two concepts have been kept separated in the past. Instead, we rein-
terpret the concepts of ethics and morality so that an eﬀective interna-
tional moral agenda becomes compatible with ethical principles. To cir-
cumvent this criticism we propose a new way of reasoning based on four
broad steps. First, the involvement in domestic aﬀairs has to be reckoned
in terms of morality. Second, the record of socioeconomic goals ought to
be within the reach of coherent policies. Third, the choice of policy in-
struments that are available to policymakers must be viewed in terms of
arranging a credible policy, in which both players adhere to ethical and
moral obligations. Fourth, the outcome has to be coherent with devised
policies and outcomes, which are answerable to all actors.
The first step for international institutions involved pertains to moral
spheres. It is virtue-centred as an individual conception based on the
ideals of reciprocal help (Smith [1759] 2002). In fact, international or-
ganisations have been established for these ends.
The second step is to agree on economic targets, e. g. inflation, ex-
change rates, fiscal policy and privatisation, and this policy has an ethical
dimension, because the international community has placed its trust for
righteous and virtue-centred commitments with institutions created ad
hoc. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that domestic authorities must follow
rules of moral conduct in laying down the terms, objectives, instruments,
and that they are fully committed to them. In other words, imf experts
ought to disentangle this second step in harmony with national policy-
makers who have a broader knowledge of domestic conditions. Ignoring
this would be ethically unproductive.
The third step combines values with both agents and credible poli-
cies to which these values adhere. An international agency has to guar-
antee world stability and apply ethically accepted rules, but the coun-
try obtaining a loan has a moral duty to commit itself to policies in an
eﬀective manner in order to increase socioeconomic impacts and long-
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term objectives. However, steps two and three may have an anomalous
ethical impact as long as agents propose rival explanations concerning
economic strategy, or domestic agents do not commit themselves to any
cost-eﬀective policy. Adam Smith ([1759] 2002), for instance, refers to
a judicious recipient behaviour to obtain aid, but the commitment to
conditions chosen by an international agency might be based either on
implausible objective values or on the use of non-eﬃcient instruments.
The above mentioned directs us to the fourth stage. If the imf and
other aid agencies were successful beforehand, this subject matter would
not be confronted, since a superior, ethical commitment by these or-
ganisations would supplant further debate over conditionality. However,
this has not been the case, because they had no full knowledge of do-
mestic circumstances, and simply applied an unchangeable ethical pro-
gramme that was in contrast with domestic and international short- and
medium-term strategies. An economic strategy that is dictated or at best
inspired by others than national experts and policymakers must be pro-
jected to help prevent a further lack of credibility, and establish a national
commitment. As long as the international commitment fails, this policy
is an ethical failure, which pushes back to the way in which stages three
and two have been undertaken. As long as these two phases are absolutely
set by an international ethics, the failure is unethical to the international
institutions. When a proper reading of steps two and three is made and a
definition of ethical sustainable commitment is ensured, then this sheds
light on the moral commitment of a country with both the moral obli-
gations and the ethical attitude of the international organisations.
In fact, how can we resolve the issue if the unethical failure is due to a
recipient’s uncommitted behaviour and not, say, to the imf, but the imf
itself is to bear full responsibility for it as having forced a stabilisation
or recovery programme that may be correct in theory but not properly
accomplished by national authorities? Alternatively, what would happen
if implausible discordance concerned both social and economic stand-
points? These two hypotheses commonly surface. The failure of the imf’s
and the World Bank’s approach is that they have overemphasised main-
stream theories and applied them everywhere without considering the
diﬀering national state of aﬀairs, and have inspired their programmes
without taking into account a country’s programmes. These interna-
tional organisations have simply misconstrued the second and third
phase of international policy eﬀectiveness and produced unethical re-
sults. There should be no autonomous approach at either extreme, that
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is, these organisations should not simply force or inspire a conditionality
based on their own ethics, nor should they finance countries with free
money without asking them to engage in a moral commitment in a sort
of agent problem. What is suspicious is that the objectives underlying
prior approaches were not credible because they were defective in the so-
cial sphere, and tight economic policies had scarce credibility when car-
ried out. This led either to uncertain commitment by domestic agents or,
at best, to a series of compromises when a country was able to influence
international decision-making. Yet, policies are credible when they are
jointly and eﬃciently agreed by domestic and international agents, and
do not fall under the economic guidance of the pure ethical orthodoxy
of international organisations which – lacking the adequate domestic
knowledge – generally imposed recipes that were not tailored to national
commitment and capabilities, thus bringing about inconsistency and
failure. As the recent commitment of the imf and World Bank seems to
go in the direction of a new ethical approach, which will broaden the
involvement of national actors, all agents must arrange definitive oper-
ational procedures in a way to enable policy makers to deal with and
commit themselves to realistic programmes. Agents ought to introduce
the right balance between ethical long-term outcomes and judicious in-
ternal commitments by implying a full commitment through four stages
of international experts, national government and the civil society or
local experts.
Because a worldwide eye constantly oversees the economy, we do not
side with those who find it realistic to dismiss the imf and perhaps other
multilateral agencies. Because they serve an essential global task, they
could not be written oﬀ, but recent economic fears of world economic
instability and the call for extending further aid to deprived populations
have given us an opportunity to suggest the way these organisations
might be working in an ethically superior manner, and we should not
pass it up. We have to rethink the logical involvement of international
and domestic actors according to their best interests, as so far the actions
have been to some extent ineﬀective. If the risks were that these organisa-
tions would continue to draw on their theory, and simplistic approaches
might stand in their way, the proposed approach would drive domes-
tic players to a position of greater trust. In the end, responsibility for the
programmes implemented or simply inspired by international economic
organisations would be attached to all, and all players would be able to
come to each other’s support. Such a new ethics in international eco-
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nomic relations requires us to look at a closer working relationship with
national experts and policymakers on one side, and international experts
on the other. This could help share information, knowledge and exper-
tise in order to support eﬀective policies that result from that network-
ing. We could not implement an ethically satisfactory reshaping without
a closer working activity among the actors.
Conclusion
This article tries to reinterpret the functions and roles of international
economic organisations in today’s global environment by oﬀering a new
perspective, which opens the way to a fresh logic of tackling national
suﬀerings in global markets. Although international economic organi-
sations have been established to deal with these issues, many observers
regularly accuse them of causing economic adversities. The criticism has
gone so far that some demand the closure of these organisations. The
two Washington-based institutions and the Geneva-based wto, for ex-
ample, are blamed for being unethical in pursuing their statutory com-
mitments. The economic rationale pursued by these organisations did
not comply with unique domestic economic conditions and complex re-
alities. Nor was it recognised that poor economies are unable to stick to
western market principles overnight, although there is ample evidence
that market principles are superior to non-market ones.
Nevertheless, the imf as well as other organisations will operate well
into the next decades and we do not join the chorus of who would de-
rive pleasure from their disruption. In contrast, to achieve the most of
the new economic agenda proposed in this article, we turn the attention
to strategic economic guidelines shaped by those actors who are ethi-
cally and morally capable of designing a credible programme of recov-
ery and structural reforms. Not counting the skill premium that inter-
national organisations convey and that may have been a roadblock to
domestic involvement, the proposed novel involvement of domestic in-
stitutions and international experts must become answerable to results
and to operational principles. Therefore, it is mandatory to take forward
specific working procedures and plans in order to achieve economic re-
sults by way of ethics and morals. As it is unavoidable to design ethics
and morals as two interrelated concepts, we must decipher the ratio-
nale that connects all economic agents to their respective obligations by
considering specific national timing and asymmetries, and viewing na-
tional and international authorities as dependable and agreeable. A set
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of policies that is operative must be arranged in a manner that compels
all actors into sharing their own responsibilities for credible programme
outcomes. Only by drawing up plans that are ethically and morally com-
pulsory to all, is it possible to keep all actors fully accountable.
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